The quote above is an excerpt from a phone conversation between Bill Ewing, the Vice President of Northwestern Paper Company 1 , and Arthur Kim, the Director of Northwestern's South Korean subsidiary. After this conversation, Ewing likely questioned himself on the advantages and disadvantages of utilizing internal transfer prices. For example, given that some subsidiaries are located in lower tax jurisdictions 2 , would it not be logical to set lower internal transfer prices from the U.S. to those subsidiaries? Would it not be logical to allow the Korean subsidiary to purchase from outside suppliers given that internal transfer prices are much higher than market prices in Chile? Allowing subsidiaries to outsource externally would lead to the bankruptcy of the US subsidiaries, which would not have enough demand for their products? What are the advantages and disadvantages of a reward system based on the allocation of internal consumption? Is the allocation process "fair" to each subsidiary? Is it "fair" to the company as a whole? Questions and doubts on transfer pricing probably haunt not only Mr. Ewing and the 1 Northwestern Paper Company is an Oregon-based firm founded in 1916. Northwestern Paper Company had grown into one of the largest U.S. producers of pulp and paper products by the 1950s. 2 As of early 1994, the federal corporate tax rate in the U.S. was 34%, with South Korean taxes ranging from 20% to 34%.
Northwestern Paper Company, but more generally all the managers who need to set internal prices for intra-firm flows of goods and services.
Transfer pricing is a major concern for multinational corporations (MNCs) as might be highlighted by the fact that approximately 80%
of Fortune 1000 must select transfer pricing strategies, requiring a complex array of financial, legal, and operational considerations (Eccles, 1985: 2) . In addition, intra-firm trade accounts for about 55% of the international trade between the EU and Japan, 40% of the trade between the EU and the US, and 80% of the trade between Japan and the US (Stewart, 1993) . That is, a large proportion of the international trade is actually intra-MNC and occurs among subsidiaries of the MNCs. These MNCs rely on internal transfer prices to value their intra-firm flows. Furthermore, transfer pricing is also a concern for governments and regulatory agencies because the manner in which MNCs price these intra-firm flows of tangible and intangible assets (Eden & Boos, 2003) across national boundaries impacts the distribution of tax income among countries. But transfer pricing is also important for the majority of multi-divisional firms, even if they do not carry out international operations.
The transfer price is the value (or price) placed on the goods, services and intangibles that are transferred within the firms, as it moves from one organizational entity (e.g., a division, an unit, a subunit, a division 3 ) to another within a corporate group (Eccles, 1985; Cravens, 1997) . Hence, while the role of prices is to efficiently allocate resources in the market, the role of transfer prices is to efficiently allocate resources within the firm. Despite substantial interests by scholars, the transfer pricing is still largely regarded as an accounting issue and hence has seen little penetration into the core management literature. Research on transfer pricing has been mainly carried out by economists, accounting professionals, and lawyers. It is not surprising that the primary focus has been on taxation considerations. In addition, much of the existing literature is largely atheoretical or, at least, does not include well-developed theory. Hence, it is also not surprising that the majority of existing research has seldom utilized established management theories to examine other dimensions (e.g., strategic, social networks, technological) of transfer pricing, or the strategic implications of transfer pricing decisions (with some notable exceptions, such as Eccles (1985) ). In fact, we have limited knowledge and understanding of fundamental questions such as: why there has been an increase in the variety of transfer pricing practices; how transaction characteristics impact transfer prices; how technological and business environment influence transfer prices; and how interdivisional relationships affect the firms' transfer pricing decisions.
In this paper we draw insights from organizational theories and current management research, and integrate these insights into a fairly comprehensive understanding of transfer pricing by multidivisional firms. We specifically focus on three main streams of research: transaction cost economics, institutional theory, and social network theory. We, therefore, examine three aspects that affect firms' transfer pricing decisions: (1) the nature of internal transfers;
(2) the firms' internal and external technological environments; and (3) the firms' internal and external social environments. In the first section of the paper, we briefly review the extant literature and research and describe transfer pricing of multidivisional firms. In the second section, we examine the factors that influence transfer pricing and propose a conceptual model that incorporates a strategic dimension to transfer pricing. We conclude with a discussion on the implications for practice and possible future research avenues.
TRANSFER PRICING: FOCUS AND APPROACHES
Transfer prices may apply to departments, divisions, subsidiaries, or affiliate business units (Cravens, 1997; Eden & Boos, 2003) . The use of transfer pricing emerged with the hierarchical multi-divisional organization. This is because as firms grow they need to organize production in multiple divisions and hence have a tendency to departmentalize knowledge and activities into more specialized subunits (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967) . As Hayek (1937) noted, the division of labor is inevitably accompanied by a division of knowledge. However, the interdependence created by divisional -9 -specialization in large multidivisional firms increases intra-firm flows, which necessitates a transfer price system to govern these exchanges/flows between divisions. A clear transfer pricing system is also important for divisional managers because they are frequently held accountable for revenues and costs (profit center) (Brickley, Smith, & Zimmerman, 2001: 433) .
The concept of transfer price can be traced to the 1880s ( Eccles, 1985 ; see also Cox, Howe, & Boyd, 1997) . Notwithstanding, it is worth noting that when discussing the theory of exchange value of material products, in The Principles of Political Economy, Harry Sidgwick (1901) recognized the possibility that producers could consume some of their own outputs. This possibility complicated his assumption that products were produced to be sold on the external market. In Sidgwick's years, most firms manufactured only one product or a narrow line of products. The later boom of decentralized multi-unit firms elevated transfer-pricing problems and caught scholars' attention.
Economists and accounting researchers made pioneer contributions to the current understanding of transfer prices. For example, Hirshleifer (1956) first formalized the transfer-pricing problem in economics, arguing that the market price was the correct transfer price only when the commodity being transferred was produced in a perfectly competitive market. If the market was not perfectly competitive, or if the market for the transferred commodity did not exist, the "correct" transfer price would be the marginal cost, given certain simplifying conditions 4 . Accounting scholars considered both economic arguments and real business needs, and devoted research efforts to taxation-minimization concerns (e.g., Grebmer, 1987) and the development of a double accounting system (e.g., Boer, 1999) . Undeniably, saving tax money is beneficial for the firms' profitability in the short term, but ignoring internal coordination may turn out to be detrimental for the firms' long-run profitability.
Albeit tax is indeed a potentially important factor in determining an optimal transfer price, by no means it is the only one.
Two conditions make transfer pricing an unavoidable component for a multidivisional firm's efficiency. First, the agency hazards within multidivisional firms make transfer pricing necessary for internal management, and stem from a lack of congruence between the interests of the agent and the principal (Ouchi, 1979; Eisenhardt, 1989; Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990) . There are at least two general types of agency problems that can be observed in large multidivisional firms: (1) the division's misrepresentation of the firm's interests as a whole, and (2) the conflicts among the divisions, which convey negative spillover effects (Eden & Li, 2003) . Thus, an "ideal" transfer pricing system depends on the comparison of the firms' total costs and benefits; that is, the spillovers between divisions must be included in the transfer price. Unfortunately, as we will discuss, an ideal system, although simple to state conceptually, is often difficult to implement in practice and requires the formulation and interpretation of the focal firm's strategy.
Second, imperfect and asymmetric information (Ouchi, 1979; Eisenhardt, 1989; Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990) (Szulanski, 1996) . Under conditions of imperfect information, the performance evaluation of business units/divisions requires establishing transfer prices for internally exchanged goods or services (Egelhoff, 1982; Eccles, 1985) . Because transfer pricing affects performance evaluations and hence managers' rewards, dispute over the transfer price between divisions is "virtually inevitable" (Brickley et al., 2001: 438) . Transfer pricing serves not only as a system for internal efficient allocation of resources/costs, but it is also a mechanism for the coordination of subunits.
Firms generally choose one of the three main approaches to value internal transfers, these are: the negotiated price, the adjusted external-market price, and the cost-based price (see, for example, Eccles, 1985; Cravens, 1997) . These approaches vary in the amount of subunit autonomy (see Table 1 ). A negotiated price is set through internal bidding, or direct negotiation, between the seller and the buyer divisions. This approach involves little or even no higher-level management. Because internal transfers only occur when both parties agree on an acceptable price, it is common to designate this as "internal market price". Internal-market prices are employed when external referent prices do not exist or the firm's strategy requires divisional flexibility. An adjusted external-market price is set in proximity to the external market prices and hence reduces the division managers' autonomy to set the transfer price. For instance, an adjusted external-market price may be determined as the market price minus a fixed discount, the best price to an outsider during a specific period, or the negotiated price with a listed price range. A cost-based price is set drawn from the supplier's costs. This approach allows the selling division to charge a markup on the cost to cover overhead and provide a profit margin. This solution leaves the selling division with little flexibility in manipulating transfer prices because it requires the division to expose all cost-related information. Table 1 summarizes these three different transfer pricing approaches and lists examples for each. Managers of the trading profit centers establish a price that is acceptable to both the seller and the buyer before the exchange can be consummated.
e.g., actual full production cost; standard production cost; full production cost plus a mark up; etc.
e.g., market price less a discount; best price to an outsider during a specific period; negotiated price with listed price range; etc.
e.g., negotiated prices between subunits, bidding.
It is worth noting that the boundaries between these three approaches are not clear-cut. In fact, this classification in three approaches does not prevent firms from utilizing other transferpricing methods that are better tailored to their idiosyncratic needs.
A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF TRANSFER PRICING
To better understand transfer pricing within large multi-unit firms through management lenses, we propose a conceptual model of transfer pricing. This model integrates the insights from three main organizational theories -i.e., institutional theory, transaction cost economics, and social networks theory -that have proved useful in explaining other organizational phenomena. We trust that the utilization of these theories on transfer-pricing research may provide insightful perspectives and highlight the importance of transfer pricing specifically in corporate strategy and international -14 -management.
In our conceptual model, we examine various conditions that may affect firms' transfer pricing decisions. Specifically, we investigate how the nature of internal transfers, firms' technological environments, and firms' social environments may influence transfer pricing. Figure 1 summarizes the main propositions advanced in the following sections. We focus on exploring the direct effects of these three factors on firms' transfer pricing decisions, and acknowledge that an explanation of possible interactions is beyond our scope, and an avenue for future studies.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
The Nature of Internal Transfers
The transfer pricing decisions are fundamentally influenced by the characteristics of the internally transferred products 5 (Adler, 1996) . There are two critical dimensions of these internal transfers.
First, transfer-pricing methods are likely to vary through the life cycle of the products subject to internal transfers. Hence, defining a transfer price for a product is even more complex for firms because this price is bound to vary as the focal products evolve along their life cycles (i.e., from introduction to growth, maturity, and decline). To some extent transfer prices are based on the availability of external referent prices. The rationale is rooted in classical economics arguments that in competitive markets the market price is the best reference for evaluating internally transferred products (Hirshleifer, 1956 ) and set a price for these internal transfers. However, when new products are first introduced, it may be difficult to find external market prices that may serve as a reference price; indeed an external market price may simply not exist. In contrast, it is easier to utilize external market prices as reference prices for mature products (CatsBaril, Gatti & Grinnell, 1988) . Therefore, it seems reasonable to suggest that in many instances the internal transfers of newly developed products (or innovations) will likely be priced on the basis of manufacturing costs due to the lack of an external reference price, and, conversely, the valuation of internal transfers of mature products may rely on existing external market prices.
Second, transfer prices are likely to vary throughout a multidivisional firm because intra-firm transactions involve different degrees of asset specificity. Williamson (1985: 55 ) defined asset specificity 6 as "durable investments that are undertaken in support of particular transactions, the opportunity cost of which investment is much lower in best alternative uses or by alternative users should be original transaction be prematurely terminated". In the presence of asset specificity, hold-up and moral hazard problems may emerge, and either the selling and/or the buying subunit may engage in opportunistic behaviors. For example, when the purchasing subunit refuses to acquire from the seller, the seller's investments in assets specific to the exchange cannot be inexpensively withdrawn or reassigned to other uses (Williamson, 1985; Spicer, 1988) . Since the external market for such idiosyncratic assets is limited, external reference prices may not be available. Additionally, the potential ex post opportunistic behavior of the buyer may decrease the selling unit's negotiation power once the investment is made. To eliminate potential transaction hazards related to asset specificity, cost-based prices are favored over negotiated prices by multi-unit firms, but demand proximate monitoring of the manufacturing processes (Spicer, 1988; Colbert & Spicer, 1995 involves a large transaction-specific investment, it seems reasonable to suggest that internal manufacturing costs will likely be the primary basis for setting transfer prices, and that a larger degree of central control over the make-or-buy decision may be needed. that can be best observed, for example, in mass assembly lines of standardized products. In these instances, to assure serial coordination, central control will tend to be high and the valuation of manufacturing costs will likely be based on attributing values to the intermediate goods transferred within the firm. This is, it seems reasonable to suggest that firm operating long-linked technologies will tend to define internal transfer prices based on costs incurred.
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The mediating technologies may be best observed in service firms linking different types of clients to each other (cfr. Thompson, 1967) . For instance, banks serve as the "bridge" for the depositors and the borrowers. These organizations rely on standardization as the mechanism to coordinate among organizational units in firms operating with mediating technologies. Given that in these firms the internal competition may have a positive impact on the units' performance, we suggest that external market prices will likely be used as referrals to set internal transfer prices. Lastly, the intensive technologies are characterized by a reliance on feedbacks from the product itself, and the technologies are largely customized. Under these conditions, it is likely that the costs for internal transfers are difficult to be determined. Moreover, it is probable that often referent market prices will not exist. Therefore, we suggest that internal transfer prices will be settled through internal negotiation between the subunits involved. In proposition form, we advance that:
Proposition 2a: Firms are more likely to utilize cost-based prices when long-linked technologies are embedded in internal transfers.

Proposition 2b: Firms are more likely to utilize adjusted marketbased prices when mediating technologies are embedded in internal transfers.
Proposition 2c: Firms are more likely to utilize negotiated prices when intensive technologies characterize the inter-linkages among the activities originating the products for internal transfers.
Internal Social Environment
The transfer-pricing problems only arise within a recognizable social system (e.g., an organization). Hence, additional insights may be drawn from considering transfer pricing in a broader social system context (Granovetter, 1985) in which internal flows occur. That is, we may gain insights by considering the internal social interfaces, or social networks, among subunits. Social networks can be defined as the collectivity of individuals, or individual groups, among whom exchanges take place and are supported by shared norms of trustworthiness (Dubini & Aldrich, 1991; Gulati, 1995; Liebeskind et al., 1996) and social control mechanisms (Coleman, 1988) . In fact, firms may be considered as networks of business units each performing specific functions and activities (Ghoshal & Nohria, 1989; Powell & Smith-Doerr, 1994; Burt, 1997) . Buckley and Casson (1998) documented the shift in contemporary organizations away from bureaucratic to newer, more flexible, possibly network-type organizational form. This shift brings to the forefront the importance of social capital (particularly trust) as a major coordination mechanism within the organization (Gulati, 1995) . As Arrow (1974: 23) stated " [t] rust is an important lubricant of a social system. It is extremely efficient; it saves a lot of trouble to have a fair degree of reliance on other people's word".
Transfer pricing, hierarchical authority, and trust are largely intertwined as firms employ these three control mechanisms to -20 -achieve governance and operational efficiency. Transfer-pricing methods provide managers with another tool for coordination (Westland, 1992) , in addition to hierarchical authority and trust.
Various transfer-pricing methods are employed to match different degrees of authority and trust to achieve the desired level of control over internal transfers of both tangible products and intangible assets (Eden & Boos, 2003) . Moreover, these three control mechanisms do not substitute each other; rather, they tend to be largely complementary. For example, if there is more trust among the subunits, the quality, timeliness and speed of information flows will be higher and will spread across different divisions facilitating mutual understanding among the subunits (Zucker, 1986) . Thus, high-levels of trust attenuate the need for authority's involvement and limit the need for strict transfer pricing mechanisms. Stated differently, interunit trust renders easier flows of information and reduces the uncertainties involved in interdivisional dependency.
Therefore, we suggest that a higher level of trust between subunits is likely to lead to the use of negotiated transfer prices.
Conversely, lower level of trust restricts information flows beyond formal report systems as imposed by hierarchical control. In these instances, all knowledge about internal transfers is either the reflection of external market prices (when they exist) or made known by headquarter requirements. Hence, it seems reasonable to suggest that a lower level of trust between subunits is likely to be associated with the use of adjusted market-based prices and/or cost-based prices.
Proposition 3: Firms are more likely to utilize negotiated transfer prices when inter-division trust is high, and to utilize adjusted external-market prices and/or cost-based prices when interdivision trust is low.
External Technological Environment
The 'external technological environment' refers to the pace of technological changes for the whole industry. It is likely that firms operating in stable external technological environment may more accurately make predictions on the major technological changes and their implications for firm performance, resources, and survival. In contrast, firms in unstable external technological environments will find it more hazardous to predict potential changes of the main technologies and the outcome of those changes (Lant & Mezias, 1990; Brews & Hunt, 1999) . The environmental (un)certainty may be assessed by the frequency of technological change, such that the more frequently major technologies change in an industry, the more uncertainty firms will experience (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967 
External Social Environment
As any other organizational activity and decisions, transfer pricing should not be analyzed in isolation of the firms' external social context (Granovetter, 1985) . Firms are not atomistic actors competing for profits against each other in a perfect marketplace (Gulati, 1998) . Instead, they are embedded in networks of social, professional, and exchange relationships with other organizations and agents in their surrounding environments (Granovetter, 1985) . This
view entail an open systems perspective that is akin to institutional theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and represents a move towards recognizing that the organization and its activities are integrated not only with an external technological environment, but also with an external social environment (Scott, 1998 ). Firm's success is contingent upon the extent to which it is able to gain legitimacy in the host marketplace.
Firms need to be embedded in their social environment to gain legitimacy and assure firms' survival and growth (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) . To gain legitimacy, organizations respond to institutional forces placed on them by the external social agents (Oliver, 1990) . DiMaggio and Powell (1983) specified three mechanisms firms may utilize to "fit" within the host environment and designated the process as isomorphism. As an organization seeks legitimacy it may endeavor to resemble (or become isomorphic) other firms operating in the host environment through one of three processes: coercive, mimetic, and normative. Coercive isomorphism emanates from an external authority and results in the need to conform to the expectations of other organizations from which the focal firm depends for resources. Mimetic isomorphism is atypical response to conditions of uncertainty and involves imitating incumbent firms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Haunschild & Miner, 1997; Haveman, 1993) . According to Haveman (1993) Organizational practices are often either direct reflections of, or strategic responses to, rules and structures built into their larger environments (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1997; Scott, 1998) . fail to comply with these "recommendations" may face legal disputes or suffer collective sanctions. Tang (2002) noted that normative isomorphism in transfer pricing practices has been observed in recent years. It is worth noting that due tot he complexity of government regulations on transfer pricing, firms increasingly turn to professional companies (or consultants) for aid in establishing transfer prices (Ernst & Young, 2001) . This is more complex for multinational firms carrying operations in several countries and facing different sets of regulations.
It seems reasonable to suggest that transfer-pricing methods can be learned or imitated. That is particularly true when transfer pricing methods can be observed directly (Gox, 2000) . At different stages of institutionalization, the balance between survival and efficiency is likely to vary. For example, in the preinstitutional stage (Barringer & Milkovich, 1998) Barringer and Milkovich (1998) noted that firms' size is an important indicator of firms' ability to resist institutional pressures and to initiate actions that break away from prevailing institutional norms. This is because large firms possess more slack resources that increase firm's resilience and resistance to institutional pressures, than small firms (Greening & Gray, 1994) . Therefore, it is likely that the institutional environment may be more influential to small firms than to large firms in setting the terms for internal transfer prices. In addition, several interaction possibilities related to firms' internal social environments may be analyzed. First, transfer prices, trust, and authority may be jointly used to cope with asset specificity.
In large multidivisional firms, it is often difficult to assess accurately asset specificity, and relatively autonomous subunits typically have the option to buy outside. Although the hierarchical governance has been suggested to incorporate the production of idiosyncratic assets to reduce opportunistic hazards (Williamson, 1985) , the hierarchical control of asset specificity arising from inside may not be sufficient.
Under such conditions, trust and transfer pricing methods may be jointly utilized and possible interactions should be studied. Second, social relationships need to be taken into consideration when analyzing how the technologies utilized require certain transfer pricing methods. Due to information asymmetry between the headquarters and the subunits, it is impossible to exert complete control over each internal transfer. Thus, trust may have a facilitating role on the definition of the transfer prices when technological requirements are critical. Therefore, the interaction between trust
and technological requirements appears interesting for future research.
Furthermore, the uncertainty involved in a firm's technological environment may also exert influence on its simultaneous consideration of survival and efficiency (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) . This is because when faced with unstable and uncertain environments organizations tend to imitate the practices of other organizations that they perceive as successful (Haveman, 1993 
